We introduce the notions of stationarily ordered types and theories; the latter generalizes weak o-minimality and the former is a relaxed version of weak o-minimality localized at the locus of a single type. We show that forking, as a binary relation on elements realizing stationarily ordered types, is an equivalence relation and that each stationarily ordered type in a model determines some order-type as an invariant of the model. We study weak and forking non-orthogonality of stationarily ordered types, show that (...) they are equivalence relations and prove that invariants of non-orthogonal types are closely related. The techniques developed are applied to prove that in the case of a binary, stationarily ordered theory with fewer than countable models, the isomorphism type of a countable model is determined by a certain sequence of invariants of the model. In particular, we confirm Vaught's conjecture for binary, stationarily ordered theories. (shrink)

This work questions the possibility of comparing the insights of eastern mysticism and modern physical science in a way of Fritjof Capra and also tries to present the problems of stating the methods of once distant cultures as relevant factors in our daily practice. While arguing for such comparison we face a lot of questions: are mysticism and modern physical science on different levels of reality; is there any sense in considering these levels “restricted”; are mysticism and modern physical science (...) operating inside separated realms of reality with non-existent trans-level concepts and relations; – these being only a few questions opened by this perspectival comparison. In the last case, for example, if two realms of reality exist, one is opened to symbolic consciousness and linguistically expressible, and the other one is opened to non symbolic consciousness and linguistically non-expressible. Though this Capra’s approach is in many aspects obscure and questionable in substantive level, it, however, on methodological level completely fits into orientational frame of bioethics as multi-perspectival area. (shrink)

Koje su mogućnosti čovjeka da preokrene putove razvoja prema mogućim civilizacijskim rješenjima, osnovno je pitanje na koje Fritjof Capra pokušava odgovoriti. Rad prikazuje na koji način Capra vidi krizu suvremenog društva i znanosti, te koje alternative vidi kao rješenja; njegov angažman pokazuje se u cjelini kao etički usmjeren na spoznaju načina odnosa u svijetu, čovjekove naravi i njegova najvišeg dobra, te je praktički usmjeren na razumijevanje konkretnog čovjekova opstanka. U radu se postavlja pitanje o mogućnosti uspoređivanja uvida istočnjačkih mistika i (...) suvremenih fizičara, onako kako to radi Fritjof Capra, te na koje se probleme nailazi kada se metode, nekada udaljenih kultura, postavljaju kao relevantni učesnici naše svakodnevne prakse. Caprini uvidi u uzroke krize, analizom mehanicističko-znanstvenog pristupa i prikaz posljedica koje je takav pristup prouzročio, pogađaju u srž problema. Njegove opservacije i primjedbe na stanje u svijetu razložne su i korisne široj stručnoj publici. Međutim, njegovo viđenje izlaska iz krize, odnosno njezino rješenje ili nadvladavanje zapada u svojevrsni religijsko-znanstveni sinkretizam, s jedne strane, a s druge u scijentizam i konstruktivizam.This work questions the possibility of comparing the insights of eastern mysticism and modern physical science in a way of Fritjof Capra and also tries to present the problems of stating the methods of once distant cultures as relevant factors in our daily practice. While arguing for such comparison we face a lot of questions: are mysticism and modern physical science on different levels of reality; is there any sense in considering these levels “restricted”; are mysticism and modern physical science operating inside separated realms of reality with non-existent trans-level concepts and relations; – these being only a few questions opened by this perspectival comparison. In the last case, for example, if two realms of reality exist, one is opened to symbolic consciousness and linguistically expressible, and the other one is opened to non symbolic consciousness and linguistically non-expressible. Though this Capra’s approach is in many aspects obscure and questionable in substantive level, it, however, on methodological level completely fits into orientational frame of bioethics as multi-perspectival area. (shrink)

Vol. 1. Logic of taste -- vol. 2. Pathology of taste -- vol. 3. Ethology of taste.

Die dritte Ausgabe der eva-edition video art versammelt Texte, die für die Theorie der Videokunst prägend sind und fortwährend inspirierend wirken. Die Anthologie enthält Beiträge von Autorinnen aus Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz, die seit Mitte der 1980er Jahre entstanden sind und den Begriff des Mediums Video bestimmen, erweitern, die spezifische Leistung der Videokunst deuten oder ihre Systematik und Historisierung versuchen. Es finden Texte Berücksichtigung, die den sich verändernden Gebrauch des Mediums reflektieren, seine (Un- )Spezifizität als Reflexionsmedium definieren und Video (...) als Katalysator für die Theoriebildung an den Schnittstellen zur Film-, Medien-, Internet- oder Performancekunst nutzen. Der Sammelband folgt entsprechend einem wissenschaftshistoriographischen Interesse ebenso wie der Herausbildung von kunst-, medien-, performance-, geschlechts- und kulturtheoretischen Schwerpunkten der Videokunsttheorie. (shrink)

In researching presuppositions dealing with logic and dynamic of belief we distinguish two related parts. The first part refers to presuppositions and logic, which is not necessarily involved with intentional operators. We are primarily concerned with classical, free and presuppositonal logic. Here, we practice a well known Strawson’s approach to the problem of presupposition in relation to classical logic. Further on in this work, free logic is used, especially Van Fraassen’s research of the role of presupposition in supervaluations logical systems. (...) At the end of the first part, presuppositional logic, advocated by S.K. Thomason, is taken into consideration. The second part refers to the presuppositions in relation to the logic of the dynamics of belief. Here the logic of belief change is taken into consideration and other epistemic notions with immanent mechanism for the presentation of the dynamics. Three representative and dominant approaches are evaluated. First, we deal with new, less classical, situation semantics. Besides Strawson’s theory, the second theory is the theory of the belief change, developed by Alchourron, Gärdenfors, and Makinson (AGM theory). At the end, the oldest, universal, and dominant approach is used, recognized as Hintikka’s approach to the analysis of epistemic notions. (shrink)

In researching presuppositions dealing with logic and dynamic of belief we distinguish two related parts. The first part refers to presuppositions and logic, which is not necessarily involved with intentional operators. We are primarily concerned with classical, free and presuppositonal logic. Here, we practice a well known Strawson’s approach to the problem of presupposition in relation to classical logic. Further on in this work, free logic is used, especially Van Fraassen’s research of the role of presupposition in supervaluations logical systems. (...) At the end of the first part, presuppositional logic, advocated by S.K. Thomason, is taken into consideration. The second part refers to the presuppositions in relation to the logic of the dynamics of belief. Here the logic of belief change is taken into consideration and other epistemic notions with immanent mechanism for the presentation of the dynamics. Three representative and dominant approaches are evaluated. First, we deal with new, less classical, situation semantics. Besides Strawson’s theory, the second theory is the theory of the belief change, developed by Alchourron, Gärdenfors, and Makinson. At the end, the oldest, universal, and dominant approach is used, recognized as Hintikka’s approach to the analysis of epistemic notions. (shrink)

The question about truth, experience and sharing of truth can be addressed from the viewpoint of a shared sense of community. The search for truth is related to the sensus communis and the conscience – con scientia – that is formed in the community. The sensus communis is not only a general faculty in all men, but also the sense that founds community. Thereby the knowledge is true only in front of the other. Truth reveals itself in conversation. By conversation (...) it means that there are both someone who asks questions and someone who answers them, and that they change their roles. In order to understand each other, they have to share a common field of experience. The approach to the concept of truth as a representation of things loses its place and gives way to the understanding of truth as something where meaning as sense and truth as open and exposed concept appears in the foreground. Phenomenology reveals that community correlates and imposes a set of senses to the consciousness and conscience of the individual. This lets phenomenologists focus on life, culture and language. The truth transforms from meaning into sense. It becomes a dynamic determination of a human being. (shrink)

Der Vortrag hat folgendes zum Ziel – das Dasein und die Universalität der Lebenswelt-Problematik sogar in solchen Fällen zu betonen, wenn sie vom philosophischen Grundeinschlag und der Orientierung auf eine streng wissen¬schaftliche Weltsicht sowie Bildung der entsprechenden theoretischen Konstruktionen scheinbar ausgeschlossen wird, wie es in der Philosophie I. Kants der Fall ist. In diesem Vortrag möchte ich über Lebenswelt als eine primäre, theoretisch unreflektierte Struktur der Weltauffassung und Weltsicht sprechen, die selbst wissenschaftlich-theoretischen Konstruktionen zugrunde liegt. Es besteht kein Zweifel daran, (...) dass die Lebenswelt ausschliesslich von einer Ganzheit historisch wandelbarer Phänomene, einem eigenartigen “historischen aapriori” gebildet werden kann. Mein Vortrag richtet sich gegen den Partikularisierungsprozess und die antiratio-nalistischen Tendenzen im Postmodernismus, gegen Versuchungen das Allgemeine (d. i., auch die Lebenswelt) in beliebigen Äußerungsformen zu verleugnen. (shrink)

We present a relatively simple description of binary, definable subsets of models of weakly quasi-o-minimal theories. In particular, we closely describe definable linear orders and prove a weak version of the monotonicity theorem. We also prove that weak quasi-o-minimality of a theory with respect to one definable linear order implies weak quasi-o-minimality with respect to any other such order.

This major work surveys the historical roots, theoretical foundations, and normative claims of 20th-century conceptualizations of public opinion. It reanalyzes leading traditions, such as those of Lippmann, Dewey, and Noelle-Neumann, and reinvents some unjustly ignored ones, such as Toennies, Harrisson, and Wilson. The book critically examines popular modern research strategies such as polling and the 'spiral of silence' model and looks at the role of mass media in the formation and expression of public opinion.

Abstract Bentham favored a free press as an instrument of public control of the state, in the interest of the general happiness. Kant favored free public discussion as an instrument for the development and expression of autonomous rationality. But a free press embodied in the property rights of the owners of the press may well fail to achieve either Benthamite or Kantian goals. Such goals lead to a personal right to communicate rather than to a corporate right to press freedom.

"Tehnicizirana" politika, te u tom kontekstu zaborav pojma dobra kao čovjekova dobrog života, čini nužnim ponovnu procjenu pojma političkog, što rezultira ispitivanjem njegove biti. U tom se smislu antičko-grčka percepcija politike pojavljuje ključnom u potrazi za odgovorom. Aristotelova praktična filozofija kao jedinstvo etike, ekonomike i politike predstavlja se u svojoj punini upravo kao philosophia anthropina - filozofija o ljudskim stvarima. U takvom kontekstu politika ostaje izraz ljudske prirode, znakovito ukorijenjena u širini ljudskog života kao put ili način ostvarivanja njegovih najviših (...) stremljenja. Bivajući takovom, neraskidivo je povezana sa svojom svrhom - zajedničkim dobrom građana; država djeluje kao politička zajednica utemeljena na načelima slobode i pravednosti. Takova posebnost pojma politike - unutar svoje vezanosti za etiku i njezina praktičkog značenja za čovjeka - može preživjeti samo kroz suočavanje sa zaboravom njezina izvornog značenja.The “technicalized” politics, and in that context the oblivion of the concept of good as man’s goodlife, urges the reappraisal of the concept of the political, resulting in the questioning of its essence.In that sense the ancient-Greek perception of politics appears crucial in the quest for the answer.Aristotle’s practical philosophy as a union of ethics, economics and politics manifests itself in itsfullness precisely as philosophia anthropina – philosophy about human matters. In such a contextpolitics remains the expression of human nature, significantly rooted in the entirety of human life asa path or way towards the realization of his highest aspirations. Being such, it is unbreakablybonded with its purpose – the common good of citizens, the state acting as the political communitybased on the principles of freedom and righteousness. Such particularity of the concept of politicswithin its link to ethics and its practical meaning for man can survive only through confronting theoblivion of its original meaning. (shrink)

Mediteran je prostor susreta. Susretanje s jedne strane znači komunikaciju, aktivnost, otvorenost, prožimanje, dok s druge strane znači i sukob, često i rat, uništenje, istrebljenje. Susretanje je, dakle, istodobno opasnost i šansa, prijetnja i prigoda, mogućnost iščeznuća i predložak za novi kvalitet, što se na Mediteranu jasno ogleda. Neprestani napon, odnosi harmonije i suprotnosti, sličnosti i različitosti, pokazuju Mediteran u bitnom upravo kao prostor posredovanja, a posredovanje kao uvjet mogućnosti nečeg takovog kao što je Mediteran.Jedno od temeljnih posredovanja, iz kojeg (...) proizlaze ostala, jest odnos čovjeka i čovjeka, što bi se, govoreći jezikom pitanja, moglo drukčije odrediti kao pitanje mogućnosti i svrhe ljudske zajednice, odnosno bîti političkog. Na Mediteranu je, između ostalog, izvorište dva, mogli bismo reći oprečna, ali određujuća pristupa ovom pitanju: tzv. tradicionalni pristup politici – antičkogrčko shvaćanje politike kao djelovanja slobodnih i jednakih građana, koji u državi kao političkoj zajednici ozbiljuju bitne svrhe ljudskoga dobroga i pravednog života te čiji najreljefniji izraz nalazimo kod Aristotela , dok je s druge strane ono što nazivamo novovjekovnim pristupom politici, koji predstavlja nasuprotni pol antičkogrčkom određenju odnosa. Radikalni obrat nastupa upravo s Machiavellijem, a raščlambom njegova djela razabiru se i utjecaji na suvremenost.The Mediterranean is a meeting point. On the one hand, meeting points imply communication, activity, openness and interlacement, while on the other, conflict, frequently even war, destruction and extermination. Meetings, therefore, represent both danger and opportunity, threat and occasion, the possibility of annihilation and a model of a new quality, which the Mediterranean clearly mirrors. Its endless tension, the relations between harmony and opposition, its similarities and differences reveal the Mediterranean, in its essence, as a zone of mediation, and mediation itself as the very prerequisite of the existence of something like the Mediterranean.One of the most fundamental mediations, out of which all the others derive, is the relationship between man and man. Once translated into the language of questions, this could be reformulated as the question of the possibility and purpose of human society, i.e. the essence of the political. The Mediterranean is, amongst other things, the source of two, one could say diametrically opposed yet determinative approaches to this issue: one is the so-called traditional approach to politics – the Ancient Greek understanding of politics as a set of actions by free and equal citizens, who fulfil the purposes of a good and virtuous life in a state as a political community, the most outstanding example of which is formulated by Aristotle – while the other is the so-called modern approach to politics, which is the polar opposite of the Ancient Greek definition of the relationship at hand. With Machiavelli a radical shift takes place, and the analyses of his work disclose his influence on contemporaneity. (shrink)

This article seeks to address current debates comparing polls and opinion mining as empirically based figuration models of public opinion in the light of in-depth intellectual debates on the role and nature of public opinion that began after the French Revolution and the controversy over public opinion spurred by the invention of polls. Issues of historical quantification and re-conceptualisation of public opinion are addressed in four parts. The first summarises the history of the rise and fall of the concept of (...) public opinion. The second re-examines the key controversies in the debates on the theoretical, empirical and social implications and consequences of the invention of polling. The third part scrutinises the datafication of public opinion that started with polling industry and continues in the age of big data and data mining. The final section discusses the controversial potentials of opinion-mining technology and suggests ways in which social scientists could critically respond to the big data and opinion-mining challenges in order to reintegrate the ideas of publicness, the public and public sphere into public opinion research. (shrink)

The European Institute of Communication and Culture and the University of Nijmegen are engaged in a long-term investigation into understanding the problems and possibilities of electronic networks in democratic life. The first of a series of seminars on this topic was held September 2001 in Piran, Slovenia. During this conference, 21 scholars from around Europe, Asia and New Zealand convened and presented papers related to a single overriding question: In what manner and to what degree can electronic networks contribute to (...) a more informed and politically active citizenry? (shrink)

Let $\mathcal M=$ be a linearly ordered first-order structure and T its complete theory. We investigate conditions for T that could guarantee that $\mathcal M$ is not much more complex than some colored orders. Motivated by Rubin’s work [5], we label three conditions expressing properties of types of T and/or automorphisms of models of T. We prove several results which indicate the “geometric” simplicity of definable sets in models of theories satisfying these conditions. For example, we prove that the strongest (...) condition characterizes, up to definitional equivalence, theories of colored orders expanded by equivalence relations with convex classes. (shrink)

Games may seem like a waste of time, where we struggle under artificial rules for arbitrary goals. The author suggests that the rules and goals of games are not arbitrary at all. They are a way of specifying particular modes of agency. This is what make games a distinctive art form. Game designers designate goals and abilities for the player; they shape the agential skeleton which the player will inhabit during the game. Game designers work in the medium of agency. (...) Game-playing, then, illuminates a distinctive human capacity. We can take on ends temporarily for the sake of the experience of pursuing them. Game play shows that our agency is significantly more modular and more fluid than we might have thought. It also demonstrates our capacity to take on an inverted motivational structure. Sometimes we can take on an end for the sake of the activity of pursuing that end. (shrink)

There seems to be a deep tension between two aspects of aesthetic appreciation. On the one hand, we care about getting things right. On the other hand, we demand autonomy. We want appreciators to arrive at their aesthetic judgments through their own cognitive efforts, rather than deferring to experts. These two demands seem to be in tension; after all, if we want to get the right judgments, we should defer to the judgments of experts. The best explanation, I suggest, is (...) that aesthetic appreciation is something like a game. When we play a game, we try to win. But often, winning isn’t the point; playing is. Aesthetic appreciation involves the same flipped motivational structure: we aim at the goal of correctness, but having correct judgments isn’t the point. The point is the engaged process of interpreting, investigating, and exploring the aesthetic object. Deferring to aesthetic testimony, then, makes the same mistake as looking up the answer to a puzzle, rather than solving it for oneself. The shortcut defeats the whole point. This suggests a new account of aesthetic value: the engagement account. The primary value of the activity of aesthetic appreciation lies in the process of trying to generate correct judgments, and not in having correct judgments. -/- *There is an audio version available: look for the Soundcloud link, below.*. (shrink)

The Greek philosopher Aristotle, writing over two thousand years before Wall Street, called people who engaged in activities which did not contribute to society "parasites." In his latest work, renowned scholar Robert C. Solomon asserts that though capitalism may require capital, but it does not require, much less should it be defined by the parasites it inevitably attracts. Capitalism has succeeded not with brute strength or because it has made people rich, but because it has produced responsible citizens and--however unevenly--prosperous (...) communities. It cannot tolerate a conception of business that focuses solely on income and vulgarity while ignoring traditional virtues of responsibility, community, and integrity. Many feel that there is too much lip-service and not enough understanding of the importance of cooperation and integrity in corporate life. This book rejects the myths and metaphors of war-like competition that cloud business thinking and develops an "Aristotelean" theory of business. The author's approach emphasizes several core concepts: the corporation as community, the search for excellence, the importance of integrity and sound judgment, as well as a more cooperative and humane vision of business. Solomon stresses the virtues of honesty, trust, fairness, and compassion in the competitive business world, and confronts the problem of "moral mazes" and what he posits as its solution--moral courage. (shrink)

I propose to study one problem for epistemic dependence on experts: how to locate experts on what I will call cognitive islands. Cognitive islands are those domains for knowledge in which expertise is required to evaluate other experts. They exist under two conditions: first, that there is no test for expertise available to the inexpert; and second, that the domain is not linked to another domain with such a test. Cognitive islands are the places where we have the fewest resources (...) for evaluating experts, which makes our expert dependences particularly risky. -/- Some have argued that cognitive islands lead to the complete unusability of expert testimony: that anybody who needs expert advice on a cognitive island will be entirely unable to find it. I argue against this radical form of pessimism, but propose a more moderate alternative. I demonstrate that we have some resources for finding experts on cognitive islands, but that cognitive islands leave us vulnerable to an epistemic trap which I will call runaway echo chambers. In a runaway echo chamber, our inexpertise may lead us to pick out bad experts, which will simply reinforce our mistaken beliefs and sensibilities. (shrink)

An adequate theory of rights ought to forbid the harming of animals to promote trivial interests of humans, as is often done in the animal-user industries. But what should the rights view say about situations in which harming some animals is necessary to prevent intolerable injustices to other animals? I develop an account of respectful treatment on which, under certain conditions, it’s justified to intentionally harm some individuals to prevent serious harm to others. This can be compatible with recognizing the (...) inherent value of the ones who are harmed. My theory has important implications for contemporary moral issues in nonhuman animal ethics, such as the development of cultured meat and animal research. (shrink)

We offer an account of the generic use of the term “porn”, as seen in recent usages such as “food porn” and “real estate porn”. We offer a definition adapted from earlier accounts of sexual pornography. On our account, a representation is used as generic porn when it is engaged with primarily for the sake of a gratifying reaction, freed from the usual costs and consequences of engaging with the represented content. We demonstrate the usefulness of the concept of generic (...) porn by using it to isolate a new type of such porn: moral outrage porn. Moral outrage porn is representations of moral outrage, engaged with primarily for the sake of the resulting gratification, freed from the usual costs and consequences of engaging with morally outrageous content. Moral outrage porn is dangerous because it encourages the instrumentalization of one’s empirical and moral beliefs, manipulating their content for the sake of gratification. Finally, we suggest that when using porn is wrong, it is often wrong because it instrumentalizes what ought not to be instrumentalized. (shrink)

Value capture occurs when an agent’s values are rich and subtle; they enter a social environment that presents simplified — typically quantified — versions of those values; and those simplified articulations come to dominate their practical reasoning. Examples include becoming motivated by FitBit’s step counts, Twitter Likes and Re-tweets, citation rates, ranked lists of best schools, and Grade Point Averages. We are vulnerable to value capture because of the competitive advantage that such crisp and clear expressions of value have in (...) our private reasoning and our public justification. There is, however, a price. In value capture, we take a central component of our autonomy — our ongoing deliberation over the exact articulation of our values — and we outsource it. And the metrics to which we outsource usually engineered for the interests of some external force, like a large-scale institution’s interest in cross-contextual comprehensibility and quick aggregability. That outsourcing cuts off one of the key benefits to personal deliberation. In value capture, we no longer adjust our values and their articulations in light of own rich experience of the world. Our values should often be carefully tailored to our particular selves or our small-scale communities, but in value capture, we buy our values off the rack. In some cases – like decreasing CO2 emissions – the costs of non-tailored values are outweighed by the benefit of precise collective coordination. In other cases, like in our aesthetic lives, they are not. This suggests that we should want different values suited to different scales. We should want value federalism. Some values are perhaps best pursued at the largest-scale level, others at smaller scales. The problem occurs when we exhibit an excess preference for the largest-scale values – when we consistently let the universal metrics swamp our quieter interests. (shrink)

In The Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan argues that although all subjects-of-a-life have equal inherent value, there are often differences in the value of lives. According to Regan, lives that have the highest value are lives which have more possible sources of satisfaction. Regan claims that the highest source of satisfaction, which is available to only rational beings, is the satisfaction associated with thinking impartially about moral choices. Since rational beings can bring impartial reasons to bear on decision making, (...) Regan maintains that they have an additional possible source of satisfaction that nonrational beings do not have and, consequently, the lives of rational beings turn out to have greater value.. (shrink)

What is a game? What are we doing when we play a game? What is the value of playing games? Several different philosophical subdisciplines have attempted to answer these questions using very distinctive frameworks. Some have approached games as something like a text, deploying theoretical frameworks from the study of narrative, fiction, and rhetoric to interrogate games for their representational content. Others have approached games as artworks and asked questions about the authorship of games, about the ontology of the work (...) and its performance. Yet others, from the philosophy of sport, have focused on normative issues of fairness, rule application, and competition. The primary purpose of this article is to provide an overview of several different philosophical approaches to games and, hopefully, demonstrate the relevance and value of the different approaches to each other. Early academic attempts to cope with games tried to treat games as a subtype of narrative and to interpret games exactly as one might interpret a static, linear narrative. A faction of game studies, self-described as “ludologists,” argued that games were a substantially novel form and could not be treated with traditional tools for narrative analysis. In traditional narrative, an audience is told and interprets the story, where in a game, the player enacts and creates the story. Since that early debate, theorists have attempted to offer more nuanced accounts of how games might achieve similar ends to more traditional texts. For example, games might be seen as a novel type of fiction, which uses interactive techniques to achieve immersion in a fictional world. Alternately, games might be seen as a new way to represent causal systems, and so a new way to criticize social and political entities. Work from contemporary analytic philosophy of art has, on the other hand, asked questions whether games could be artworks and, if so, what kind. Much of this debate has concerned the precise nature of the artwork, and the relationship between the artist and the audience. Some have claimed that the audience is a cocreator of the artwork, and so games are a uniquely unfinished and cooperative art form. Others have claimed that, instead, the audience does not help create the artwork; rather, interacting with the artwork is how an audience member appreciates the artist's finished production. Other streams of work have focused less on the game as a text or work, and more on game play as a kind of activity. One common view is that game play occurs in a “magic circle.” Inside the magic circle, players take on new roles, follow different rules, and actions have different meanings. Actions inside the magic circle do not have their usual consequences for the rest of life. Enemies of the magic circle view have claimed that the view ignores the deep integration of game life from ordinary life and point to gambling, gold farming, and the status effects of sports. Philosophers of sport, on the other hand, have approached games with an entirely different framework. This has lead into investigations about the normative nature of games—what guides the applications of rules and how those rules might be applied, interpreted, or even changed. Furthermore, they have investigated games as social practices and as forms of life. (shrink)

Анотація. У статті проаналізовані досягнення Соціального Вчительства Католицької Церкви, репрезентовані працями Лева ХІІІ, Пія ХІ, Пія ХІІ, Івана Павла ІІ, що розкривають змістовні характеристики поняття «принцип субсидіарності», його роль і значення в системі християнських цінностей. Принцип субсидіарності робить можливими такі взаємовідносини в соціальному житті, коли спільнота вищого порядку не втручається у внутрішнє життя спільноти нижчого порядку, перебираючи на себе належні тій функції; заради спільного добра, спільного блага вона надає їй у разі потреби підтримку й допомогу, узгоджуючи у такий спосіб її (...) взаємодію з іншими соціальними структурами. Принцип субсидіарності скеровує соціальну практику на утвердження спільного блага в людському співтоваристві. Поширення і застосування принципу субсидіарності протистоїть небезпеці «одержавлення» суспільства та найзагрозливіших проявів колективізму, обмежує абсолютизацію влади, бюрократизацію державних і соціокультурних структур, стає одним із гарантів дотримання прав і свобод громадян своєї країни. (shrink)

In her BBC Reith Lectures on Trust, Onora O’Neill offers a short, but biting, criticism of transparency. People think that trust and transparency go together but in reality, says O'Neill, they are deeply opposed. Transparency forces people to conceal their actual reasons for action and invent different ones for public consumption. Transparency forces deception. I work out the details of her argument and worsen her conclusion. I focus on public transparency – that is, transparency to the public over expert domains. (...) I offer two versions of the criticism. First, the epistemic intrusion argument: The drive to transparency forces experts to explain their reasoning to non-experts. But expert reasons are, by their nature, often inaccessible to non-experts. So the demand for transparency can pressure experts to act only in those ways for which they can offer public justification. Second, the intimate reasons argument: In many cases of practical deliberation, the relevant reasons are intimate to a community and not easily explicable to those who lack a particular shared background. The demand for transparency, then, pressures community members to abandon the special understanding and sensitivity that arises from their particular experiences. Transparency, it turns out, is a form of surveillance. By forcing reasoning into the explicit and public sphere, transparency roots out corruption — but it also inhibits the full application of expert skill, sensitivity, and subtle shared understandings. The difficulty here arises from the basic fact that human knowledge vastly outstrips any individual’s capacities. We all depend on experts, which makes us vulnerable to their biases and corruption. But if we try to wholly secure our trust — if we leash groups of experts to pursuing only the goals and taking only the actions that can be justified to the non-expert public — then we will undermine their expertise. We need both trust and transparency, but they are in essential tension. This is a deep practical dilemma; it admits of no neat resolution, but only painful compromise. (shrink)

Recent conversation has blurred two very different social epistemic phenomena: echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Members of epistemic bubbles merely lack exposure to relevant information and arguments. Members of echo chambers, on the other hand, have been brought to systematically distrust all outside sources. In epistemic bubbles, other voices are not heard; in echo chambers, other voices are actively undermined. It is crucial to keep these phenomena distinct. First, echo chambers can explain the post-truth phenomena in a way that epistemic (...) bubbles cannot. Second, each type of structure requires a distinct intervention. Mere exposure to evidence can shatter an epistemic bubble, but may actually reinforce an echo chamber. Finally, echo chambers are much harder to escape. Once in their grip, an agent may act with epistemic virtue, but social context will pervert those actions. Escape from an echo chamber may require a radical rebooting of one's belief system. (shrink)

The current study represents an integrated model of explicit and implicit offensive language taxonomy. First, it focuses on a definitional revision and enrichment of the explicit offensive language taxonomy by reviewing the collection of available corpora and comparing tagging schemas applied there. The study relies mainly on the categories originally proposed by Zampieri et al. (2019) in terms of offensive language categorization schemata. After the explanation of semantic differences between particular concepts used in the tagging systems and the analysis of (...) theoretical frameworks, a finite set of classes is presented, which cover aspects of offensive language representation along with linguistically sound explanations (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk et al. 2021). In the analytic procedure, offensive from non-offensive discourse is first distinguished, with the question of offence Target and the following categorization levels and sublevels. Based on the relevant data generated from Sketch Engine (https://www.sketchengine.eu/ententen-english-corpus/), we propose the concept of offensive language as a superordinate category in our system with a number of hierarchically arranged 17 subcategories. The categories are taxonomically structured into 4 levels and verified with the use of neural-based (lexical) embeddings. Together with a taxonomy of implicit offensive language and its subcategorization levels which has received little scholarly attention until now, the categorization is exemplified in samples of offensive discourses in selected English social media materials, i.e., publicly available 25 web-based hate speech datasets (consult Appendix 1 for a complete list). The offensive category levels (types of offence, targets, etc.) and aspects (offensive language property clusters) as well as the categories of explicitness and implicitness are discussed in the study and the computationally verified integrated explicit and implicit offensive language taxonomy proposed in the study. (shrink)

Recent discussions in the just war literature suggest that soldiers have a duty to assume certain risks in order to protect the lives of all innocent civilians. I challenge this principle of risk by arguing that it is justified neither as a principle that guides the conduct of combat soldiers, nor as a principle that guides commanders in the US military. I demonstrate that the principle of risk fails on the first account because it requires soldiers both to violate their (...) strict duty of obedience and loyalty and to exceed their special obligations to protect their fellow comrades, the state, the state's constituents and other protected civilians. I then illustrate that the principle of risk fails on the second account since it conflicts with the commander's primary obligation to protect and promote the welfare and lives of his or her soldiers. I conclude by arguing that we cannot reasonably expect soldiers and commanders to adhere to the principle of risk until there is a radical, institutional-level transformation of militaristic goals, values, strategies, policies, warrior codes and expectations of service members in the US Armed Forces. (shrink)

Монографія "Функціональність релігії: український контекст".

This classic and controversial book examines the roots of the idea of virtue, diagnoses the reasons for its absence in modern life, and proposes a path for its recovery.

Michel Foucault had a great influence upon a wide range of disciplines, and his work has been widely interpreted and is frequently referred to, but it is often difficult for beginners to find their way into the complexities of his thought. This is especially true for readers whose background is Anglo-American or "analytic" philosophy. C. G. Prado argues in this updated introduction that the time is overdue for Anglo-American philosophers to avail themselves of what Foucault offers. In this clear and (...) greatly-revised second edition, Prado focuses on Foucault's "middle" or genealogical work, particularly Discipline and Punish and Volume One of The History of Sexuality, in which Foucault most clearly comes to grips with the historicization of truth and knowledge and the formation of subjectivity. Understanding Foucault's thought on these difficult subjects requires working through much complexity and ambiguity, and Prado's direct and accessible introduction is the ideal place to start. (shrink)

Стаття С. Присухіна «Іван Павло ІІ про логіку діалогу між Католицькою Церквою та ісламом» присвячена філософськобогословським напрацюванням Папи Римського Івана Павла ІІ щодо аналізу змістовних характеристик поняття «діалог між католицизмом і ісламом», а також логіки його здійснення в непростому й суперечливому сьогоденні.